Euthyphro Dilemma: God is irrelevant to ethics?

Socrates (469-399 BC)

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, May 9, 2013

Euthyphro Dilemma: God is irrelevant to ethics?

Some philosophers object to the idea that the Christian God is the basis of ethics because of what's called the Euthyphro dilemma, taken from the work of the ancient philosopher Plato (c. 429-347 BC).

(Euthyphro is a character in one of Plato’s dialogues by the same name wherein Socrates, who was Plato's teacher and whom Plato greatly admired, questions Euthyphro’s understanding of the relationship between the gods and moral value.)

The question raised by the Euthyphro dilemma is this: Does God will something because it is good, or is it good because God wills it? Both options, it is alleged, make God irrelevant to ethics.

On the one hand, if God wills something because it is good, then this would imply that there is a standard of goodness which is independent of God. The goodness of the thing is why God wills it, which means that even God is subservient to the good. So we don’t need God for ethics.

On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then this would make God's will seem morally ungrounded and capricious. God's will would make an action good, so whatever God wills would be right. But this means that God could will, say, child abuse and rape, and so child abuse and rape would be right. Of course, we already know that such behaviours are evil. So we (again) don't need God for ethics.

Either way, according to the Euthyphro dilemma, God isn’t the foundation of ethics. Or so the objection goes.

Is the objection reasonable? Answer: No.

It turns out that there is a third option which allows us to escape the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma: i.e., God is the standard of good and God wills something because doing so is an expression of God’s essentially good nature.

At this juncture, it may help to remember Plato's metaphysical understanding of reality. Plato distinguishes between The Good, i.e., the absolute Form (idea/ideal), and a demiurge, i.e., a god-like being (craftsman/artisan). On Plato's view, the demiurge is distinct from and subservient to The Good; the demiurge is a part of the cosmos; and the demiurge's role is to add pre-existent eternal forms/ structures to the formless stuff of the cosmos.

According to the Christian conception of God, however, God is significantly unlike Plato's demiurge. Rather, God is the Creator of the cosmos (including all its stuff, formless or not) and God also is The Good. This means that, contrary to the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, goodness is not independent of God.

Moreover, according to the Christian view of God, God’s will is subject to and reflects God's own unchangeably good nature. God can only do and will that which is in accordance with His own nature, which is perfect goodness itself. This means that, contrary to the second horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, God's will is not morally ungrounded or capricious.

Contemporary Christian philosopher William Lane Craig (in his book On Guard) clarifies: “[M]oral values are not independent of God because God’s own character defines what is good. God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so on. His nature is the moral standard defining good and bad.”

Craig continues: “[God's] commands necessarily reflect His moral nature. Therefore, they’re not arbitrary.”

Craig adds: “When the [critic] demands, ‘If God were to command child abuse [or rape], would we be obligated to abuse our children [or commit rape]?” he’s asking a question like ‘If there were a square circle, would its area be the square of one of its sides?’ There is no answer because what it supposes is logically impossible.”

Therefore, the solution to the Euthyphro objection is that God wills the good because God is good, which means that independent of God no standard of goodness exists nor is God’s will arbitrary.

In other words, the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma—so God remains relevant to ethics.

(Note: To say that God remains relevant to ethics is not to say that a person who doesn't believe in God can't be moral or can't have knowledge of objective moral values. Rather, it is to say that God provides moral values with an objective/real metaphysical ground. Philosophically, this is significant.)

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)

Thinking about Diversity: Theatre, Fallacy, Bill 18, Lady Gaga

APOLOGIA

By Hendrik van der Breggen

The Carillon, April 18, 2013

Thinking about Diversity: Theatre, Fallacy, Bill 18, Lady Gaga

Several weeks ago I had the pleasure of seeing the play Schoolhouse, authored by Canadian playwright Leanna Brodie and performed at Providence University College, the school at which I teach philosophy. It spurred me to think deeply about diversity.

Before I begin, let me say (brag) that the play, a fictional story about a rural one-room school in 1938, was done with excellence. I am confident that the cast and crew of Providence’s production of Schoolhouse made all who are affiliated with Providence proud. The acting and stagecraft were superb.

In Schoolhouse, in a song by a likable character named Milton, Brodie ably presents an instance of the false dichotomy fallacy, a fallacy that seems to darken the minds of those inclined to ostracize and bully others.

(The false dichotomy fallacy is the mistake in reasoning wherein two alternatives are set out as if they are the only two alternatives, but in fact there is a third, unnoticed alternative. That we tend not to notice the third alternative leads us astray in our thinking.)

“Everyone should be like me,” sings Milton. The moral gist of Milton's song is that if you’re not like Milton (i.e., not like me or us), then you’re bad—and thus a target for “othering” or bullying. Enter the dichotomy that either you’re like Milton or you’re bad. However, as Brodie makes clear in the play, there is a third (and fourth, etc.) alternative: i.e., there are many good people who are not like Milton!

Brodie is correct in her critique of those whose thinking (narrow-mindedness) is mistakenly limited by the two alternatives—the false dichotomy—implied by Milton's song. For this, Brodie is to be commended.

But let’s leave Brodie’s one-room school and fast forward from 1938 to 2013.

For many today “diversity” makes mere difference a sufficient condition for moral approval. For many today the mere fact of difference seems enough to justify a moral position or public policy as good.

Think of Manitoba’s proposed anti-bullying Bill 18 and its call to respect “human diversity,” including the unqualified diversity of “all sexual orientations and gender identities.” (Note: The word “all” is in the bill. Think about what “all” could mean.)

Or think of the popular song “Born This Way” in which Lady Gaga celebrates various diversities, including sexual diversity, “'cause God makes no mistakes.”

Diversity—difference—is assumed to be a good.

But is mere difference a sufficient condition for moral approval?

To harken back to Brodie’s Schoolhouse, the contemporary popular understanding of diversity in effect says this: “if you’re not like Milton (i.e., me or us), then you’re good,” which is logically equivalent to “either you’re like Milton or you’re good.” (For first-year logic students: “If P then Q” is logically equivalent to “Not-P or Q.”1)

Now we should ask: Is this a new version of the false dichotomy fallacy? Is there an unnoticed third alternative?

What about those who are not like Milton and are not good? That is to ask: What about persons who do wrong or have propensities to do wrong such that their wrongdoings and propensities for wrongdoing are different from our own wrongdoings and propensities for wrongdoing?

Should we respect and celebrate their actions and propensities? Should we respect and celebrate the construction of personal identities that are given over to such actions and propensities?

And (to be consistent) should they respect and celebrate our wrongdoings and propensities for wrongdoing? Should they respect and celebrate our construction of personal identities that are given over to wrongdoing?

To be sure, we should respect and accept all people, because each person has intrinsic worth (and because each person is made in God’s image). No bullying should be allowed, period.

But we should also keep in mind that respecting and accepting all people doesn’t mean that we should accept and affirm all the behaviours of all people, nor does it mean that we should accept and affirm all their (our) dispositions and urges to behave in various ways.

Why not? Because not all behaviours are good—some behaviours are harmful to one’s self and/or others. (The Christian God, who makes no mistakes, calls such behaviours sin.)

Think about serial rapist (and murderer) Ted Bundy. He had sexual propensities and urges that are different. But, surely, Bundy was bad.

Pedophiles have propensities and urges that are different, too. So do people who are prone to alcoholism, temper tantrums, lying, thievery, greed, gossip, gluttony, etc.

In other words, the appeal to “diversity” as a justification of a moral position or public policy requires further thinking. We should ask: Is acting out on a difference good for one's self or others? Or not?

When we think of diversity, then, we need to keep in mind that what is important is the nature of the difference, not the mere fact of difference. Clearly, some differences are good, and some differences are bad.

With all due respect to Lady Gaga, “born this way” doesn't mean we ought to act this way.2

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)

Notes

1. More slowly, and with colour, for the sake of clarity: “If P then Q” is logically equivalent to “Not-P or Q.” Where P is not-like-Milton and Q is you're-good: "If not-like-Milton then you're-good" is logically equivalent to "Not-not-like-Milton or you're-good."

2. Acknowledgment/confession: I got the idea for my last sentence (about Lady Gaga) from Daniel Kuebler's "Memo to Lady Gaga: 'Born This Way' Doesn't Mean 'Act This Way'".

Euphemisms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

APOLOGIA
By Hendrik van der Breggen
The Carillon, March 28, 2013

Euphemisms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

The use of language is an art—and so is its abuse. Today I will look at the use and abuse of euphemisms.

When certain words are considered too blunt, harsh, painful, or offensive, people sometimes substitute a euphemism, that is, a more acceptable term, a term with fewer negative connotations or with more positive connotations, than the blunt, harsh, painful, or offensive term.

In her book The Practical Study of Argument, philosopher Trudy Govier explains: “There is a sense in which euphemism is the opposite of emotionally charged language. With emotionally charged language, terms are more emotional than appropriate. Euphemism, on the other hand, involves a kind of whitewashing effect in which descriptions are less emotional than appropriate."

Govier adds, "Bland, abstract, polite language is used to refer to things that would be found embarrassing, demeaning, appalling, or horrible.”

Govier warns, “Euphemistic language [can] function to desensitize us, to dull our awareness of such things.”

I would emphasize that not only can euphemisms desensitize us emotionally, but also they can hide reality—including moral reality.

Interestingly, the dangers inherent in euphemism were almost prophetically envisioned by George Orwell in his famous novel 1984 and in his lesser known essay “Politics and the English Language.” Orwell put forward the idea that an effective mechanism of political control is the manipulation of euphemisms employed in public discussion. (A deeper look at Orwell's work may be a topic for another time.)

Here are some examples of useful but harmless euphemisms.

“I’m sorry that Sam passed away.” These words allow us to be sensitive to Sam’s grieving wife and are infinitely kinder than saying, “I’m sorry about Sam’s getting slowly crushed to death by the gravel truck.”

“May I use the washroom?” Yes, as any parent knows, these words allow children to be sensitive to those around the dinner table. Respect and politeness are good, to be sure.

Or consider these fun euphemisms (from Govier): “I’m vertically challenged,” said jokingly by a short person; “I’m gravitationally challenged,” said jokingly by someone who is overweight; “I’m follically challenged,” said jokingly by someone (such as myself) who is balding.

But some euphemisms are not fun, can be dangerous, and are bad.

Consider the following: “Gather intelligence,” versus spy activity; “pacification centre,” versus concentration camp; “incontinent ordnance,” versus off-target bombs; “friendly fire,” versus shelling friendly villages or one's own troops by mistake; “terminate,” versus kill; “terminate with extreme prejudice,” versus assassinate.

The phrase “terminate a pregnancy” is sometimes used to talk about abortion, which is the destruction of a pre-natal child/fetus. But, of course, birth terminates a pregnancy too.

The phrase "products of conception" is sometimes used to describe the union of the sperm and the egg, which is (or so some allege) no big deal to destroy. But human being with potential is a more informative description of what is destroyed. Destroying a human being is a big deal.

Sadly, in the abortion debate the use of euphemism moves from the merely bad to the downright ugly.

Consider this euphemism: “partial birth abortion.” Dare to think about it. Such an "abortion" involves (a) delivering a late-term prenatal baby until only its head remains in the birth canal, (b) then vacuuming the baby’s brains out through the back of the baby’s skull, and (c) then crushing the baby’s skull to facilitate complete birth.

Consider this euphemism, too: “After-birth abortion.” This phrase has been used recently by some philosophers to describe—and justify—the killing of live born babies. Seriously.

Alarmingly, the above abortion euphemisms have thwarted careful moral thinking about abortion generally, late-term abortion in particular, and infanticide—all of which many if not most people would find morally problematic if they knew the reality hidden behind the words.

Are there any other euphemisms that should concern us presently? What about "sex-selective pregnancy termination"?

I submit that the phrase “sex-selective pregnancy termination” is a euphemism for the premeditated, deliberate killing of innocent preborn children merely because they are female. In other words, I think that the phrase is a euphemism for murder. And I think the act of deliberately killing a pre-natal baby girl, because she is a girl, remains a species of murder whether defended by cultural misogyny or an ideology of unconstrained abortion rights.

Sadly, sex-selective abortion occurs in Canada. Happily, MP Mark Warawa’s motion 408 seeks to stop it. (Sadly, motion 408 was deemed non-votable last week by a Parliamentary sub-committee. Happily, Mr. Warawa is making an appeal.)

To be sure, euphemisms can be useful, even good. Sometimes, however, euphemisms can distort our understanding of what is real and thereby mask—and encourage us to accept—horrendous evil. Such euphemisms are bad, even ugly.

Let’s be careful with our use of language—someone’s life may depend on it!

(Hendrik van der Breggen, PhD, is assistant professor of philosophy at Providence University College.)